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BLD-280        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-1649 
___________ 
 
RONALD RILEY, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
GOVERNOR TOM CORBETT; LT. TODD HARMAN; GOVERNOR TOM RIDGE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-13-cv-02646) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 23, 2015 
 
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  July 29, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Ronald Riley appeals pro se from the District Court’s dismissal of his civil rights 
action.  For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
I. 
 In his second amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Riley, convicted of rape 
in 1985, alleged that provisions of Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§§ 9791-9799.41, which was enacted in 1995, violated his constitutional rights.  In 
particular, he complained that he should not be required to register under Megan’s Law.  
He also asserted that he should not be subject to lifetime registration as a “Tier III” 
offender, where the lifetime registration requirement was added in 2012 and then applied 
to him without affording him notice, hearing, or a right to counsel to evaluate whether he 
fit in the category of Tier III offenders. 1  Riley named as defendants Todd Harmon, a 
state police officer, and Tom Corbett, then-Governor of Pennsylvania.  He also named 
Tom Ridge, who was the Governor of Pennsylvania when Megan’s Law was enacted.   
 Harmon and Corbett moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Megan’s Law 
did not impose criminal penalties and was therefore not subject to ex post facto 
restrictions.  Several months later, Ridge also moved to dismiss on essentially the same 
grounds.  The District Court granted the motions to dismiss, holding that because 
                                              
1 Riley contended throughout the District Court proceedings that he had been classified as 
a “sexually violent predator,” but the District Court correctly found that he was in fact 
placed in the lesser category of “sexual offender” (ECF No. 49 at 11).  Because Riley was 
convicted of rape, the provisions of Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law required that he be 
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Megan’s Law’s registry requirements were not punitive in nature, requiring Riley to 
register as a sexual offender was not an Ex Post Facto Clause violation and also did not 
violate his due process rights.  The District Court also denied Riley leave to further 
amend his complaint.  Riley appeals. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s order granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss.  McGovern v. 
City of Phila., 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 2009).  We review the District Court’s denial of 
leave to amend for abuse of discretion.  See Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 223 (3d 
Cir. 2004).  We may summarily affirm if the appeal presents no substantial question.  See 
3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
III. 
In order to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Riley must allege a 
violation of the Constitution or federal law committed by a person acting under color of 
law.  See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).  Riley claimed that his constitutional 
rights under the Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clauses were violated when he was 
required to register as a Tier III sexual offender.  The District Court properly dismissed 
Riley’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because 
Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law does not impose criminal punishment.  
                                                                                                                                                  
classified as a “Tier III” offender, the most serious of the three sexual offender statuses.  
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 We begin with the District Court’s dismissal of Riley’s claim that application of 
the registration requirement to him violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.  “Under the Ex 
Post Facto Clause, the government may not apply a law retroactively that ‘inflicts a 
greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.’”  Artway v. 
Att’y Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1247 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 
Dall.) 386, 390 (1798)).  However, this prohibition applies only to criminal, as opposed 
to civil, impositions.  See Myrie v. Comm’r, N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 267 F.3d 251, 255 (3d 
Cir. 2001).   
 To determine whether the retroactive imposition of a sexual offender registry law 
constitutes a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, we must first determine whether the 
legislature meant to impose punishment, as opposed to merely establishing “‘civil’ 
proceedings.”  Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (citation omitted).  We accord great 
deference to the legislature’s stated intent.  See id.  If the intention was to enact a civil 
regulatory scheme, then we look to both the purpose and the effect of the law to 
determine if either factor is so punitive “as to negate [the State’s] intention to deem it 
civil.”  Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).   
 The stated purpose of Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law is not to punish offenders, but 
rather to protect public safety by notifying the police and public of sexual offenders’ 
whereabouts.  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9799.11 (“It is the intention of the General 
                                                                                                                                                  
See Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9799.14(d)(2). 
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Assembly . . . to further protect the safety and general welfare of the citizens of this 
Commonwealth.”).  The Supreme Court ruled that a similar stated purpose was not 
punitive when “[t]he legislature found that sex offenders pose a high risk of reoffending, 
and identified protecting the public from sex offenders as the primary governmental 
interest of the law.”  Smith, 538 U.S. at 93 (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
 When analyzing whether the objective purpose of a particular piece of legislation 
constitutes punishment, courts must focus on “whether analogous measures have 
traditionally been regarded in our society as punishment.”  E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 
1077, 1093 (3d Cir. 1997).  With respect to the effects of sexual offender registration 
requirements, courts should analyze “whether, in its necessary operation, the regulatory 
scheme: has been regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment; imposes an 
affirmative disability or restraint; promotes the traditional aims of punishment; has a 
rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or is excessive with respect to this 
purpose.”  Smith, 538 U.S. at 97.   
 The Supreme Court has concluded that the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act 
has the legitimate, nonpunitive purpose of protecting the public from harm and that its 
registration requirements are not punitive in effect.  See Smith, 538 U.S. at 93 & 98-99.  
We have determined that the similar New Jersey law does not violate the Ex Post Facto 
Clause because it is not punitive in purpose or effect.  See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1266-67 
(holding that the registration provisions of New Jersey’s Megan’s Law do not constitute 
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punishment); Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1103-05 (holding that the notification provisions of 
New Jersey’s Megan’s Law do not constitute punishment for purposes of the Ex Post 
Facto Clause).   
 For purposes of this analysis, the Pennsylvania Megan’s Law requirements that 
Riley challenged are not materially different from the Alaska and New Jersey provisions 
that the Supreme Court and we, respectively, have held not to violate the Ex Post Facto 
Clause.  Therefore, despite his argument to the contrary, Riley did not establish that 
requiring him to register as a sexual offender amounted to an ex post facto violation.  
Accordingly, the District Court properly dismissed the claim.   
 We turn to the District Court’s dismissal of Riley’s due process claim.  Riley 
appeared to argue that he should have been afforded procedural due process protections 
before he was classified as a Tier III offender and subjected to the lifetime registration 
requirement.  In Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4 (2003), 
the Supreme Court concluded that, assuming that a liberty interest is implicated, due 
process does not mandate the opportunity to prove a fact that is not relevant to a sexual 
offender registration statute.  Here, the statute mandates categorization based on the 
offender’s conviction.  Riley was convicted of rape, which is classified as a Tier III 
sexual offense.  See Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9799.14(d)(2).  Because it is uncontested that 
Riley was properly tried and convicted, he has received the process that he is due, and a 
further hearing (with the related procedural protections he requested) is not required.  See 
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Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 4.  Accordingly, the District Court was correct to 
dismiss Riley’s due process claim. 
 Given that Riley’s second amended complaint presented essentially identical 
allegations as his previous complaints and that the complaint still failed to state a 
constitutional violation, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying leave to amend on the ground that it would have been futile.  See Grayson v. 
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
 
